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This paper examines the evolution of hours worked in France, Germany, Italy and the US from 1956-2003
and assesses the role of taxes and technology to account for the differences. The empirical work establishes
three results. First, hours worked in Europe decline by almost 45% compared to the US over this period.
This change is almost an order of magnitude larger than the effects associated with the increase in
unemployment over this time period. Second, the decline occurs at a steady pace from 1956 until the
mid 1990s, in contrast to the fact that the relative increase in unemployment occurs in the mid 1970s.
Third, the decline in hours worked in Europe is almost entirely accounted for by the fact that Europe
develops a much smaller service sector than the US. I build a simple model of time allocation to understand
the evolution of total hours worked and their distribution across sectors, and calibrate it to match the
US between 1956 and 2000. I find that relative increases in taxes and technological catch-up can account
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Beginning in the early to mid 1970’s the economies of continental Europe experienced a
sharp and persistent increase in unemployment rates relative to the US. This observation
has motivated a large literature that seeks to understand the reason for the deterioration
in European labor market outcomes.1 A common approach has been to look for common
shocks that occurred in the 1970s and institutional diﬀerences that led to diﬀerent
propagation of those shocks.
While the unemployment rate is often used to measure aggregate labor market out-
comes, an obvious alternative, in the tradition of Lucas and Rapping (1969), is to focus
on hours of market work. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to provide an analy-
sis of changes in market work in Europe and the US over the period 1956-2003. Two
key ﬁndings emerge. First, although outcomes in Europe deteriorate relative to the
US whether measured in terms of unemployment or hours of work, the timing of the
c h a n g e si sv e r yd i ﬀerent. Whereas diﬀerences in unemployment rates emerge in the
mid 1970’s, the decline in hours of market work in Europe relative to the US begins in
the mid 1950s and continues at a fairly steady rate until the mid 1990’s. In particular,
neither the time series for absolute or relative hours of market work in Europe displays
any apparent change in behavior in the 1970s relative to either the 1960s or the 1980s.
Second, the decrease in relative hours of work is much larger, by roughly an order of
magnitude. Hours of work in France, Italy and Germany decline by more than 45% rel-
ative to the US, while the change in hours of work associated with the relative increase
in unemployment is only about 4%. Two conclusions emerge from this analysis. First,
even if we understood the causes of the diﬀerent evolutions in unemployment, there are
dramatic diﬀerences in the evolution of hours of work that would remain unaccounted
for. Second, focusing only on the period since 1970 is likely to be misleading since the
relative decline in hours of work begins much earlier.
The second contribution of the paper is to show that a deﬁning property of the
evolution of hours of work in Europe relative to the US is that European economies
have not developed a market service sector similar to that in the US as they have
caught up to the US in terms of overall development. In particular, I argue that one
must view the evolution of sectoral labor allocations in the US and Europe from the
perspective of the structural transformation of economic activity that accompanies the
process of development. Poor economies devote most of their resources to agriculture,
but as they develop, activity moves ﬁrst from agricultural to manufacturing and services,
and then later from both manufacturing and agriculture into services. In the mid 1950s
Europe lags the US in terms of development, but closes much of the gap during the
subsequent 45 years. Accordingly, one expects that relative to the US, in the mid 1950s
1Examples include Bertola and Ichino (1996), Daveri and Tabellini (1997), Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), den Haan, Haefke and Ramey
(2002), and den Haan (2003).
1Europe should have a much higher employment rate in agriculture and industry, and
much lower in services. This conjecture is conﬁrmed by the data. Since Europe has
eﬀectively caught up to the US by 2000, as measured by output per hour, holding all
else constant one would expect that sectoral labor allocations look similar in Europe
and the US. However, as of 2000, Europe has largely converged to the US levels for
employment rates in agriculture and industry, but employment in services is only 70%
of the level in the US, which is the same as it was in 1956. In 2000 almost all of the
diﬀerence in hours of work are accounted for by diﬀerences in the service sector.
Having established these facts, I develop a s i m p l em o d e lo ft i m ea l l o c a t i o na c r o s s
activities, calibrate it to match the US structural transformation over the period 1956-
2000, and use this model to account for Europe’s hours of work relative to the US in
1956 and 2000. Given that the changes occur at a fairly steady pace over a long period,
it seems natural to consider driving forces that also exhibit ongoing change over the
period 1956-2000. My analysis focuses on two such candidates: diﬀerences in the size
of government tax and spending programs, and diﬀerences in technology. Two main
results are obtained. First, diﬀerences in aggregate hours of work in 1956 and their
distribution across sectors can largely be accounted for by the fact that Europe lags the
US technologically by about 40 years. In particular, the model accounts for the fact
that hours of work in 1956 are almost ten percent higher in Europe despite the fact that
tax rates are higher. Second, diﬀerences in hours of work in 2000 and their distribution
across sectors can largely be accounted for by the fact that Europe has tax rates on the
order of 15-20% higher than the US.
Combined, these two ﬁndings tell us that it is the combination of relative changes in
technology and taxes that account for the diﬀerent evolution of both total market work,
and its distribution across sectors. Speciﬁc a l l y ,t h er e a s o nt h a tE u r o p ef a i l st od e v e l o pa
service sector similar to the US is that at the same time that changing technology creates
an economic force leading to greater hours of work in the service sector, Europe raises
taxes, thus creating an opposing force that encourages services to be provided outside
of the market. A key feature of the model is that individuals are able to produce
good substitutes for many market services using a home production technology, thus
explaining why higher taxes thus cause the production of services to move from the
market sector to the home sector, and the asymmetric eﬀect of taxes across sectors.
This mechanism is similar to the marketization of production view stressed by Freeman
and Schettkat (2002) and supported by their analysis of time use studies for Germany
and the US. Time use studies by Olovsson (2004), and Ragan (2005) also support this
mechanism, as does the analysis of Davis and Henrekson (2004) based on more aggregate
data. 2
2Messina (2003) argues that entry barriers in the service sector may also have been quantitatively
important in aﬀecting the movement of labor into the market service sector in Europe. See also Fonseca,
Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001) for empirical evidence in support of this eﬀect in a cross-section of
countries and Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) for the analysis of a speciﬁc entry barrier in France.
2An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 contrasts the behavior of unemployment
and hours of work diﬀerences in Europe and the US over the period 1956-2003. Section
3 shows how the diﬀerent evolution of aggregate hours of work is dominated by the
diﬀerences in the evolution in the market service sector along the process of structural
transformation. Section 4 presents a model of structural transformation, which is cali-
brated in Section 5 and then used to account for European hours of work in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Aggregate Labor Market Outcomes in Europe and the US
While there is a large literature contrasting the evolution of aggregate labor market
outcomes between the US and continental Europe, the bulk of this literature uses the
aggregate unemployment rate as its reference measure for aggregate labor market out-
comes. This section demonstrates that one obtains a very diﬀerent perspective on the
evolution of diﬀerences in aggregate labor market outcome if one instead focuses on the
amount of work being done.
I contrast average outcomes in France, Germany and Italy with those in the US,
and will refer to the average of France, Germany and Italy as corresponding to Europe.
Similar results emerge with a larger set of countries from the continent chosen to rep-
resent Europe, but I focus on these three for two reasons. First, they are the three
largest economies in continental Europe and second, these three (along with Belgium)
are currently the European economies with the lowest levels of hours worked.
2.1. Data
The labor market data used here is obtained from two sources. Annual data on employ-
ment, unemployment and population comes from the OECD Employment Database.
Data on annual hours of work per person in employment comes from the Groningen
Growth and Development Center. Data is available going back to 1956, so the period
considered is 1956-2003. Total hours of work is measured as the product of employ-
ment and annual hours of work per person in employment. To make comparisons across
time and countries, one needs to normalize aggregate hours of work by some measure of
population. I choose the size of the population aged 15-64 (referred to as the working
age population) as the normalizing factor. Because our interest is in the low frequency
changes in the data, attention is focused on trend components, which are deﬁned using
the HP ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
2 . 2 .H o u r sW o r k e di nt h eU Sa n dE u r o p e
This subsection contrasts the evolutions of aggregate hours worked in Europe and the
US. Figure 2.1 shows the trend components.




















































Figure 2.1: Hours Worked in Europe and the US
These two series display dramatically diﬀerent behavior. Hours worked in Europe
are initially higher but then decrease at a fairly steady rate until the mid 1980s, at which
point they level out. In contrast, hours worked in the US are relatively ﬂat until the
mid 1980s, at which point they experience a fairly steady increase until around 2000.
To better focus on the diﬀerences in hours worked across the two countries it is of
interest to look at the percent diﬀerence in hours worked in Europe relative to the US.
This is shown in Figure 2.2
Figure 2.2 illustrates three key points. First, the decline in hours worked in Europe
relative the US is a process that proceeded at a relatively constant rate for roughly 40
years beginning (at least) in the mid 1950s. Second, the magnitude of the decline is
large: hours worked in Europe decline by almost 45% relative to the US. Third, although
hours worked in Europe and the US are similar in the late 1960s, hours worked are not
similar prior to this date.
While I will not make any use of it in the subsequent analysis, it is perhaps of
interest to assess the relative importance of declines in employment to population ratios
and hours per worker in employment.3 As shown in Figure 3, the declines are roughly
comparable.
2.3. Unemployment in the US and Europe
Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of the diﬀerential in unemployment rates between the
US and the three European countries being studied here. As noted earlier, there is a
3Rogerson (2004) documents the change in employment and unemployment rates between Europe
and the US. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b) had earlier noted that diﬀerences in participation rates
were much larger than diﬀerences in unemployment rates.
















































Figure 2.2: Percent Diﬀerence in European Hours Worked Relative to US















































Figure 2.3: Components of Hours Worked in Europe Relative to the US




































Figure 2.4: Unemployment Rate Diﬀerential
very large literature that examines the evolution of unemployment in Europe relative
to the US. This literature emphasizes that beginning in the mid 1970s, unemployment
in Europe increases very signiﬁcantly relative to the US and remains high up to the
present time.
Figure 2.4 conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the earlier literature. Prior to the mid 1970s
t h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ed i ﬀerential is relatively constant, with unemployment being
somewhat lower in Europe, but beginning in the mid 1970s this diﬀerential increases
gradually through to the late 1990’s, at which point the diﬀerential is around 5%.
2.4. Comparing Hours and Unemployment Evolutions
One key diﬀerence between the evolution of hours worked diﬀerences and unemployment
rate diﬀerences concerns timing. Although the picture of unemployment rate diﬀeren-
tials shows little change prior to the mid 1970s, hours worked in Europe decline relative
to the US since the mid 1950s, with no evidence of anything noteworthy about the
period from the mid 1970s on.
A second key diﬀerence concerns magnitudes. A simple calculation allows us to gauge
the importance of the evolution of the unemployment rate diﬀerential in accounting for
the evolution of the diﬀerential in hours of work. First, I choose 1970 as the benchmark
year.4 Next, consider a year diﬀerent than the benchmark year, say 1990. I take the
increase in the unemployment rate from 1970 to 1990 and ask by how much hours
worked in 1990 would increase if the unemployment rate had remained at its 1970 level
and all of the excess unemployed workers were assumed to be employed and worked the
4Other choices for the benchmark year lead to the same conclusion.










































Component Due to Unemployment
Figure 2.5: Role of Unemployment in Accounting for Diﬀerences in Hours of Work
same number of hours as an average employed worker in 1990. Doing this for each year
we can construct a time series showing the eﬀect of changes in the unemployment rate
on the hours of work diﬀerential. The results are shown in Figure 2.5, along with the
information from Figure 2.2 showing the actual diﬀerences in hours worked in Europe
relative to the US.
The picture shows that unemployment can account for only a very small fraction of
the total changes over the time period, and that this remains true even if we focus on
the period since 1975.
Two conclusions follow. First, between 1956 and 2003 there has been an enormous
change in relative time devoted to market work in Europe and the US, and this change
has occurred at roughly a steady pace from 1956 through the mid 1990s. Second, even
if we could perfectly account for the diﬀerent evolutions in unemployment, this would
be of little help in accounting for these changes in time devoted to market work.
3. Structural Transformation and the Role of Services
The previous section documented a steady decline of hours worked in Europe relative
to the US since 1956. If less time is being devoted to market production in Europe
relative to the US, it is potentially of interest to ask which activities are not being done.
If the decreases are concentrated among a given set of activities this information may
help to shed light on potential sources of the decrease. This section presents evidence
to establish two points. First, the decline in hours worked in Europe relative to the US
is largely accounted for by the fact that as Europe catches up to the US in terms of
overall productivity, it does not develop a market service sector of the same magnitude











































Figure 3.1: Structural Transformation in the US
as the US. Second, Europeans currently spend more time in home production than do
Americans, thereby oﬀsetting some of the diﬀerences in time devoted to market work.
3.1. Market Work by Sector
I consider three broad sectors—agriculture, industry and services, and for each sector
I compute a sectoral employment rate which is total sectoral employment divided by
total population aged 15-64.5 I focus on employment rather than hours for two reasons.
First, complete time series on hours by sectors for all four countries are not available,
and second, the data that is available shows that hours per employed worker move
similarly across sectors, so that movements in relative sectoral hours across countries
are dominated by movements in relative employment rates.
It is important to be aware of the process of structural transformation that ac-
companies development when comparing sectoral employment rates. Speciﬁcally, as
emphasized by Kuznets, early on in the development process an economy devotes most
of its labor to the agricultural sector. In the early phases of development, the economy
reallocates labor from the agricultural sector to both the industry and service sectors.
Later, the economy enters a phase of development where it reallocates labor from both
the agriculture and industry sector into the service sector. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show
how sectoral employment rates have evolved in the US and Europe since 1956.
5I note that the concept of sectoral employment rates are distinct from the concept of sectoral
employment shares. The former has population in the denominator and sum to the employment to
population ratio, whereas the latter has employment in the denominator and therefore sum to one.
Data for sectoral employment is taken from the OECD Data Base and the 2001 issue of the OECD
Historical Statistics.
















































Figure 3.2: Structural Transformation in Europe
Consistent with Kuznets’ description, in both cases the service sector employment
rate increases throughout the period and the agriculture sector employment rate de-
creases throughout the period. The sectoral employment rates for industry behave
diﬀerently in the two ﬁgures. In the US, this rate decreases throughout the entire pe-
riod, while for Europe it actually increases modestly until the late 1960s before starting
to decrease. One interpretation of this diﬀerence is that the US is in the second phase
of the structural transformation during the entire period, while Europe passes from the
ﬁrst phase to the second phase during the late 1960s. Given that Europe lags in the
development process in the mid 1950s but largely catches up to the US by the end of
the period, this interpretation seems reasonable.
Although both economies display the same qualitative features of the structural
transformation that Kuznets emphasized, we next show that there is a pronounced
quantitative diﬀerence between the two. To see this, Figure 3.3 shows the sectoral
employment rates for Europe relative to the US, deﬁned as the ratio of the two values.
For ease of presentation, in this graph we combine industry and agriculture.
The picture reveals a striking ﬁnding. Given that Europe lags the US in the de-
velopment process in 1956, one expects Europe to have relatively high employment in
agriculture and industry and relatively low employment in services, and indeed, this
pattern is found in the data. Over the subsequent 45 years, as Europe virtually catches
up to the US in terms of development (measured as output per hour), holding all else
constant we would expect that Europe’s relative employment levels should converge to
US levels. But, while this occurs in agriculture and industry, we see that the relative
employment level in services remains ﬂat at roughly .70 for the entire period.
P u ts o m e w h a td i ﬀerently, as of 2000, Europeans have both lower employment rates







































Figure 3.3: Relative Sectoral Employment Rates in Europe
and lower levels of annual hours worker per person in employment. But, as Table 1
shows, the discrepancy in employment levels is accounted for almost exclusively by
diﬀerences in employment in services.
Table One
European Employment Rate Diﬀerential With US
Year Agriculture Industry Services
1956 11.2 3.4 -9.4
2000 0.5 1.2 -15.5
It seems that any theory that seeks to account for the diﬀerent evolution of total
hours worked in Europe and the US must be able to also explain why the diﬀerences
are so skewed toward services.
3.2. Homework versus Market Work
The previous section analyzed the diﬀering evolutions of market work across sectors
and noted that diﬀerences in 2000 were largest in the service sector. One distinguishing
feature of many activities in the market service sector is that they have good nonmarket
substitutes. Examples include child care, cooking, cleaning, house repairs, yard main-
tenance, and elderly care. In view of this it is of interest to examine the extent to
which diﬀerences in market work are oﬀset by compensating diﬀerences in nonmarket
work. Unfortunately, data availability prevents a time series analysis of cross-country
patterns. However, in this section I brieﬂys u m m a r i z eﬁndings in several recent papers
which provide useful information about diﬀerences in recent cross-country analyses.
10Three diﬀerent studies oﬀer information about recent cross-country diﬀerences in
home and market work based on time use studies. A common ﬁnding is that diﬀerences
in market work are indeed signiﬁcantly oﬀset by diﬀerences in homework, though the
extent of this oﬀset varies across studies. In the most extreme case, Freeman and Schet-
tkat (2002) ﬁnd that total hours of work for adults is roughly the same for Germans and
Americans, with the only diﬀerence being the allocation of these hours between home
and market work. This study also shows that the patterns of consumer expenditure
diﬀers in a corresponding fashion, i.e., Germans spend more time on meal preparation
at home and spend less money at eating establishments. Olovsson (2004) found a simi-
lar result for time allocations between Sweden and the US: additional home work made
up for 90% of the discrepancy in market hours between Swedes and Americans. Lastly,
using data from the recent Harmonized Time Use Study, Ragan (2005) compares several
European countries with the US and ﬁnds that Europeans engage in more homework
than do Americans, and that this increase in homework oﬀsets about one third of the
diﬀerences in time devoted to market work.6
Related work has also been carried out by Davis and Henrekson (2004). Consistent
with the economic mechanism that will be discussed later in the paper, they show that
countries with higher marginal tax rates systematically have lower employment in those
market activities for which there are good nonmarket substitutes.
4. A Model of Time Allocation
This section develops a simple model of time allocation to account for the process of
structural transformation. In the following sections, the model is calibrated to match
the process of structural transformation in the US and then used to assess the eﬀect of
taxes and technology on hours worked in Europe over time. The model will emphasize
two factors that display steady ongoing change over the period 1956-2000: changes
in government tax and spending programs, and changes in technology. Technological
change will encompass both changes in relative productivities across market sectors as
well as between the home and market sectors.
4.1. Model
A key criterion for the model is that it be able to generate the change in hours worked
across sectors associated with the process of structural transformation. Two main classes
of models have been used in the literature to produce this outcome. The ﬁrst class em-
phasizes non-homotheticities in preferences—if income elasticities are not all unitary then
as an economy becomes richer it will change the allocation of resources across sectors.
6Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) present data from another source which challenges this con-
clusion. As noted by these authors, however, their data set seems ill-suited to cross-country comparisons.
The Harmonized Time Use data set used by Ragan was designed to speciﬁcally address the shortcomin-
ings mentioned by Alesina et al, and hence seems more reliable.
11Examples following this approach include Echevarria (1997), Kongsamut, Rebelo and
Xie (2001) and Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2005). A key implication of this class of
models is that technological change which is neutral across sectors can produce ongoing
reallocation of activity across sectors. The second class of models stresses uneven tech-
nological progress across sectors—if relative productivities are changing across activities
and substitution elasticities across goods are not unitary, then labor will be reallocated
across activities. Baumol (1967) is an early example of this class, while Ngai and Pis-
sarides (2004) provide a recent generalization. A noteworthy feature of this approach
is that it can generate a structural transformation with homothetic preferences, as long
as the elasticity of substitution between goods is not unity.
The model adopted here is a hybrid of these two approaches. Non-homotheticities
will be central to the reduction of hours worked in agriculture, but uneven technolog-
ical progress will be central to the movement of resources from industry into services.
This hybrid approach is motivated by two factors. First, Ngai and Pissarides ﬁnd that
uneven technological change can account for much of the reallocation between industry
and services but is not suﬃcient to explain the reallocation of resources out of agricul-
ture. Second, the presence of a non-hometheticity in preferences produces a mechanism
whereby hours of work decrease with development at low levels of productivity.7
The model is eﬀectively a sequence of static time allocation problems. Preferences
are assumed to be constant over time and across economies, but productivitities and
tax rates will be allowed to diﬀer. The focus of the analysis is on how these factors
aﬀect time allocations. To ease notation in what follows I suppress time subscripts and
focus on the time allocation problem solved in a particular period.
There is a representative household with preferences given by:
U(C,1 − H)+V (A)
where C is a composite good representing consumption of non-agricultural goods and
services, H is total time allocated to work (1 − H is leisure), and A is consumption of
agricultural goods. The function U is assumed to be log-linear in C and 1 − H:8
U(C,1 − H)=aC log(C)+( 1− aC)log(1− H)
The composite consumption good C is deﬁned by:
C =[ aIIε +( 1− aI)F(S,N)ε]1/ε
where I is consumption of goods produced in the industrial sector, and F is an aggregate
7Based on data in Maddison (1995), all current rich countries experienced decreases in time devoted
to work via the margin of shorter workweeks during the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e2 0 t hc e n t u r y .
8Note that as the size of the agricultural sector becomes small, these preferences are consistent with
balanced growth.
12of market services (S) and nonmarket production (N).9 We further assume that the
aggregator F is also CES:
F(S,N)=[ aSSη +( 1− aS)Nη]1/η.
Utility derived from the consumption of agricultural products, V (A), is assumed to
take a very simple form. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that individuals do not desire more
than ¯ A units of the agricultural good, but also that they require consumption of at
least this amount, i.e., V (A)=m i n {A, ¯ A} if A ≥ ¯ A and that V (A)=−∞ if A< ¯ A.
In equilibrium this will imply that the allocation of labor to agriculture is completely
determined by productivity in agriculture and hence that the movement of labor out of
agriculture is completely determined by improvements in agricultural productivity.
Next we turn to a description of technology. For simplicity we abstract from capital
and assume that all technologies are linear in labor:
I = AIHI,A = AAHa, S = ASHS, N = ANHN.
where the Hi are the time allocations to sector i,a n dt h eAi are productivity parame-
ters.10
As noted earlier, we also allow for a government in the model. We assume that there
is a proportional tax rate levied on labor income from market work at rate τ,a n dt h a t
this tax is used to ﬁnance a lump-sum transfer T to the representative agent.11
4.1.1. Equilibrium
I study a competitive equilibrium for this economy. With the linear production technolo-
gies one can determine all of the prices based on the technology parameters. Speciﬁcally,
if we normalize the wage rate to one, it follows that the prices of the agricultural good
(PA), the industrial good (PI) and (market) services (PS) must be the inverse of the












9Implicitly we assume that most nonmarket production consists of services that are substitutable
with market provided services. One could easily allow for the possibility that industrial goods can
be produced at home, but as an empirical matter this does not seem to be a particularly important
component of production in rich economies, and hence we abstract from it.
10Since we abstract from capital, diﬀerences in labor productivity implicitly incorporate diﬀerences
due to capital as well as due to technology adoption, regulation, etc.
11Given that the home sector produces a good substitute for market services and is not taxed, one
could also interpret home activity in the model to include unreported activities as well. It is plausible
to think that the act of operating outside of the market makes the services imperfect substitutes for
those produced in the market, and that a diﬀerent technology must be used.
13Taking these prices and the transfers from the government as given, in equilibrium
the representative agent chooses values of consumption (A,I,S,N), time allocated to
market work (HM) and time allocated to home work (HN) to maximize:
U(C,1 − HM − HN)+V (A)
subject to the constraints:
PII + PSS + PAA =( 1 − τ)HM + T
N = ANHN
HM + HN ≤ 1
plus nonnegativity constraints.
Equilibrium also requires an allocation of market time across sectors that is consis-
tent with market clearing:
A = AAHA, I = AIHI, S = ASHS, HM = HA + HI + HS (4.2)
and a value of transfers that is consistent with the government budget constraint:
T = τHM. (4.3)
One can combine the ﬁrst order conditions for the consumer maximization problem
with the market clearing conditions and the government budget constraint to obtain the






















HAAA = ¯ A (4.7)
The ﬁrst equation states that the marginal rate of substitution between home and mar-
ket services is equal to the (tax-distorted) marginal rate of transformation between home
and market services. The second equation states that the marginal rate of substitution
between industrial goods and (market) services is equal to the marginal rate of transfor-
mation between the industrial good and (market) services. Note that since taxes aﬀect
these two activities equally, the tax rate does not explicitly enter this expression. The
third equation states that at the margin, the consumer is indiﬀerent between working
14more in the industrial sector and taking more leisure. Of course, given the ﬁrst two
equations, this indiﬀerence extends to the consideration of working additional time in
any of the sectors. Finally, the fourth equation states that output from the agricultural
sector is equal to the food requirement, ¯ A. Given the form of the utility function for
utility derived from food there is no standard marginal condition for time devoted to
agriculture.
T h el a s te q u a t i o nc a nb es o l v e df o rt h ev a l u eo fHA, leaving three equations in the
three unknowns HI, HS,a n dHN. Moreover, simple algebraic manipulation shows that












It follows that the model can be reduced to solving a system of two equations for the
two unknowns HI and HS.
For future purposes it is important to note the following implication of the model
for time allocations. Given a value of agricultural productivity (which eﬀectively deter-
mines hA), the remaining elements of the time allocation (hI,h S,h N) are homogeneous
of degree zero in the three remaining productivity parameters, (AI,A S,A N).T h a ti s ,
scaling all three of these productivities proportionately will not change the time alloca-
tion. This results from the fact that preferences are homothetic in the non-agricultural
allocation. It follows that time allocations alone can only determine productivities in
these three activities up to a scale factor.
4.2. Technological Change in the Home Sector
In the model just described, an increase in home sector productivity will lead to an
increase in hours worked in the home and fewer hours worked in the market service
sector. Many researchers (see, e.g., Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorokoglu (2005)) have
argued that many technological advances in the home sector are labor saving and lead
to less time devoted to home production. In this subsection I describe a variation on
the model which can capture this type of mechanism.
Previously we wrote the home technology as N = ANHN. Consider instead the
speciﬁcation N = A1N + A2NHN. In this speciﬁcation A1N can be interpreted as
an endowment of home produced goods and can capture the essence of labor saving
technological progress at home. In this speciﬁcation, uniform technological progress in
A1N, A2N, AI,a n dAS holding AA constant will leave the time allocation (HI,H S,H N)
unchanged. Whereas an increase in A2N holding all else constant will lead to an increase
in home hours, an increase in A1N will lead to a decrease in home hours. The key point
to note is that one can obtain a decrease in time spent in home production either by an
increase in home productivity, if it is labor saving, or by a decrease in home productivity,
if it is labor augmenting. This is relevant for the exercises that follow because we will
be using data on hours of market work to infer technological change in the home sector.
15The above discussion shows that without additional data one cannot infer the di-
rection of technological change in the home that is required to obtain a given proﬁle of
hours worked in the market. While it is of independent interest to determine the nature
of technological progress in the home sector, I found that the model’s implications for
the issues addressed here, such as how time allocations respond to taxes, were virtually
identical for the two speciﬁcations. In view of this, in what follows I will simply assume
that all technological progress in the home is labor augmenting, but it should be kept in
mind that whether the home sector technology is advancing more slowly or more quickly
than the market service technology is ultimately not pinned down by the analysis.
5. The US Structural Transformation
In this section the model is calibrated to match the evolution of sectoral labor inputs
for the US economy between 1956 and 2000.
5.1. Labor Input Across Sectors
Earlier we presented data on the evolution of sectoral employment rates. From the
perspective of the model the object of interest is hours worked across sectors. The
Groningen Growth and Development Center provides data on annual hours of work
by sector for France, Germany, Italy and the US for selected years between 1950 and
2000.12 These data are used to produce series for hours of work per person aged 15-64
across sectors in 1956 and 2000.13
A few remarks are in order regarding the construction of these statistics. For 2000
there data on hours by sector for all countries. Hours data by sector for the US in 1956
exist, while for Germany there are data for 1955 and 1960, and for France there are
data for 1950 and 1960. For Italy there are sectoral employment data prior to 1979
and data on aggregate hours of work, but not a breakdown of total hours by sector. I
construct sectoral shares of hours for France in 1955 as the simple average of the 1950
and 1960 values. I impute sectoral hours for Italy by scaling the sectoral values for
France by Italian relative employment levels and then scaling these values to match
aggregate hours for Italy.14 These imputed values for Italy along with the French and
German values for 1955 are used to determine the average distribution of hours across
12The data for 2000 come from the 60 Sector Data Base, and the data for 1956 come from the 10
Sector Data Base.
13In these calculations I have included construction in the service sector. The reason for this is that
in the US, the construction industry has increasing hours worked over time relative to population and
exhibits very low relatively productivity growth, thereby making it more suited to the service sector. The
main eﬀect of this change is to increase the gap between productivity growth in services and industry,
thereby lowering the calibrated value of ε. Construction is small relative to services so the eﬀect on
services per se is quite small.
14I scaled the French numbers since aggregate hours per worker in Italy are much closer to France
than to Germany in 1956, but the results are very similar if I instead scaled based on the average of
Germany and France.
16sectors, and are then applied to the total hours of work for Europe in 1956 to determine
the European sectoral allocation in 1956.
In the model, time endowment is normalized to one. To map actual hours into
fractions of time endowment devoted to work I assume that total time devoted to market
work in the US in 1956 is equal to 1/3. Table Two shows the resulting values for sectoral
labor input relative to time endowment for both Europe and the US in 1956 and 2000.
Table Two
Sectoral Labor Inputs Relative to Time Endowment
US Europe
hA hI hS Agg hA hI hS Agg
1956 .032 .089 .209 .330 .097 .104 .163 .364
2000 .008 .057 .292 .357 .010 .052 .176 .238
As described below, the calibration procedure will also require information on time
allocated to the home sector in the US in 1956. Aguiar and Hurst (2005b) report that
the ratio of home to market work in 1965 is approximately .75, and given this one point
estimate we set the fraction of time devoted to the home production in 1956 for the US
equal to .25.
5.2. Tax Rate Diﬀerences
Computing eﬀective marginal tax rates on labor and how they have changed over time
for a representative worker is a diﬃcult task. I do not contribute to the literature on how
best to measure these taxes, and instead rely on the estimates that have been provided
by others. Mendoza et al (1994) develop a methodology for determining average tax
rates on labor, capital and consumption across countries. Data limitations preclude
one from carrying out this procedure for years prior to 1965, but for France and Italy
there are no data available prior to 1970. In a recent paper, Prescott (2004) modiﬁes
the method of Mendoza et al and incorporates progressivity in marginal income tax
rates into the analysis. He concludes that eﬀective marginal tax rates on labor in the
US were approximately .40 in both the early 1970s and the mid 1990s.15 Evidence on
government revenues relative to GDP and government spending suggests that tax rates
increased modestly in the US during the period 1956-1970. In my calibration I set the
t a xr a t ei nt h eU Se q u a lt o.35 in 1956 and .40 in 2000.
Prescott obtains a marginal tax rate for the three European countries of roughly 60%
in the mid 1990s. Tax rates have been lowered somewhat in the late 1990s, but since
economic activity is likely to respond with somewhat of a lag to these decreases, I will
consider values of both .55 and .60 for Europe in 2000. Tax rates increased signiﬁcantly
in Europe over the post WWII period. Prescott obtains a rate slightly above .45 for
Europe in the early 1970s. In 1960, government receipts as a fraction of GDP is roughly
15These eﬀective rates incorporate tax rates on consumption.
17ﬁve percent higher in Europe than it is in the US. Given this information I assume the
same diﬀerential for tax rates in 1956 and therefore set the European tax rate equal to
.40 in 1956.
It is important to note that in terms of the results obtained below what matters is
the diﬀerences in tax rates over time and across countries, and not the level of the taxes
per se. So, the key properties of taxes for what follows is that tax rates in 1956 are
5% higher in Europe than the US, and that tax rates increase by 5% in the US and by
15 − 20% in Europe.
5.3. Preference and Technology Parameters
Given the values for the US tax rates in 1956 and 2000, in this section I show how all
preference and technology parameters except for η can be calibrated by requiring that
the model replicate the US time allocations in 1956 and 2000. Calibrating the model
requires setting values for eight technology parameters (four productivities in each of
the two periods), and six preference parameters (two elasticity parameters, three share
parameters, and the subsistence parameter). Note ﬁr s tt h a ta l lo ft h ep r o d u c t i v i t y
parameters for the initial period can be normalized to one, since this corresponds to a
choice of units. Agricultural productivity in 2000 is chosen so as to be consistent with
agricultural hours in 2000. We choose productivity in industry and market services for
the US in 2000 to match growth in output per hour as reported in the Groningen ten-
sector data base between 1956 and 1997.16 The growth rates are 2.47% and 1.26% per
year for industry and market services respectively. The determination of home sector
productivity in 2000 is determined below.
The parameter η determines the elasticity of substitution between home and mar-
ket produced services, and will be important in determining how time is reallocated
between the home and the market in response to tax changes and changes in relative
productivities. Using aggregate data, McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997) ﬁnd a
value in the range of .40 − .45, while Chang and Schorfheide (2002) ﬁnd a value in
the range of .55 − .60. Using micro data, Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (1995) ﬁnd
an estimate in the range .40 − .45, while Aguiar and Hurst (2005a) report an estimate
for their benchmark speciﬁcation in the range of .55 − .60. These estimates correspond
to the elasticity of substitution between all market and nonmarket consumption, while
in the model it only refers to the substitutability between market services and home
production. To the extent that many of the most easily substitutable components of
consumption are services, it seems appropriate to choose a slightly higher value for the
elasticity, thus motivating the choice of η = .55.17 I also report results for the cases of
16The 10 sector data base has data from 1955-1997, whereas the 60 sector data base has data from
1979 onward. Since they have diﬀerent base years and the ten sector data base covers almost the entire
period I have chosen to use the data from a single source.
17There are many market services that do not have good nonmarket produced substitutes (e.g.,
advanced medical procedures). A richer model would incorporate heterogeneity within services to reﬂect
18η = .5 and η = .6.
The parameter ε determines the amount of substitution between goods produced
in the industry sector and services and determines how much labor will be reallocated
between the industry and service sector in response to uneven changes in productivity
growth. If ε approaches zero, preferences over I and F(S,N) approach a Cobb-Douglas,
and in this case there is no reallocation of labor in response to relative productivity
changes. To get reallocation from a sector with higher productivity growth to one with
lower productivity growth it is necessary for ε to be negative. As we describe in more
detail below, we choose ε to be consistent with the amount of observed reallocation of
labor given observed productivity changes.
Given values of η and ε the four preference parameters ¯ A, aC, aI and aS are chosen
so that the model reproduces the 1956 time allocation for the US displayed previously,
including the target of hN = .25. The two remaining parameters to be set, the elasticity
parameter ε, and the productivity of the home sector in 2000, are chosen to match
the time allocations in industry and market services in 2000.18 For the benchmark
calibration with η = .55, this implies a value of ε = −2.65.
As noted earlier, what is signiﬁcant about the home and market sectors is the direc-
tion of time allocation and not the direction of technological change. If time allocated
to homework decreases, this can be due to either faster technological growth in the
home sector if it is of the labor saving variety, or to slower technological change if it
aﬀects labor productivity at the margin. Although time devoted to homework in the
US in 1956 is used in the calibration procedure, time devoted to homework in 2000 is
not. The calibration implies that time spent in nonmarket services is .1871,w h i c hc o r -
responds to a decline of approximately 25% over the period 1956-2000. This is similar
to the decline noted by Aguiar and Hurst (2005b).19 Assuming only labor augmenting
technological change in the home sector, this decrease in time spent at home requires
that home productivity grew more slowly than market service productivity. In fact,
the calibration requires that home productivity decreases marginally over the 44 year
period. Of course, if home productivity growth were all labor saving then technological
change must have been more rapid than the 1.26% experienced in the market service
sector.20
Table Three shows the parameter values implied by the calibration procedure. Rather
this fact, but the above value is chosen to reﬂect that at the margin there is substantial opportunity for
substitution between home and market produced services.
18Loosely speaking, one can think of choosing the value of ε so as to match the time devoted to
industry in 2000 and then choosing the technology in nonmarket production in 2000 to match the time
devoted to market services.
19Aguiar and Hurst (2005) report a drop of roughly 30% between 1965 and 2003 per person aged
21-65. It seems likely that the per-person decrease would be less if we included individuals aged 15-20.
In any case, given the various measurement issues involved, the model’s prediction does not seem to be
greatly at odds with the available data.
20To the extent that technological regress in the home sector is not plausible, this suggests that at
least some of the technological progress must have been of the labor saving variety.
19than report the level of the technology parameters in 2000 I have reported the implied
annual growth rates (in percent), denoted by γi for sector i.
Table Three
Calibrated Values for the US Economy
ε η γA γI γS γN aC aI aS ¯ A
−2.65 .55 3.26 2.47 1.26 −0.2 .63 .02 .59 .032
It is of interest to examine how the calibrated model accounts for the changes in
time devoted to market work in the US between 1956 and 2000. As seen in Table Two,
market work in the US increases by almost 10% during this time period, despite the fact
that taxes are assumed to increase by 5%. The model is able to generate a substantial
increase in market work despite the tax increase by having a movement of activity
from the home sector into the market sector that is driven by changes in technology.
According to the calibrated model, if home technology had grown at exactly the same
rate as the market service sector technology but all other changes were kept in place,
then market hours in the US would have fallen by more than 15% over the period 1956-
2000. Of this 15%, roughly 2/3 of the decrease is due to the increase in tax rates, while
the remaining third is due to the increase in productivity in agriculture interacting with
the homotheticity in preferences. Moreover, the increase in the size of the market service
sector would have been almost zero, as the movement out of industry and into market
services associated with uneven technological progress would have been virtually oﬀset
b yt h ei n c r e a s ei nt a x e s .
6. Accounting for Hours of Work in Europe
In this section we use the calibrated model to interpret hours of work in Europe in 1956
and 2000. Throughout this analysis we assume that preference parameters in Europe are
the same as in the US, but allow that tax rates and productivities may diﬀer. The goal
of the exercise carried out here is to assess the role of diﬀerences in technology and taxes
in accounting for the diﬀerences in hours worked in Europe and the US in 1956 and 2000.
While it would seem that a natural exercise would be to solve the model using sectoral
productivities for Europe in 1956 and 2000, given values for tax rates in Europe in 1956
and 2000, this is not possible. The reason is that systematic sectoral accounts that
permit cross-country comparisons of sectoral productivity have not yet been developed.
Whereas aggregate productivity comparisons such as those provided by the Penn World
Tables can be carried out using only prices for ﬁnal goods and investment, one would
also need international prices for all intermediate inputs to compute sectoral relative
productivities. Absent accounts that explicitly address this issue, the numbers that one
obtains from various exercises are not reliable.21 Additionally, home sector productivity
21This is evidenced by the exchange between Bernard and Jones (1996) and Sorensen (2001), which
showed how comparisons based on one particular procedure are very sensitive to assumptions about
base year because of changes in relative prices.
20is a potentially important parameter and there is no data available to measure this
productivity. Given these issues, I will simply carry out several calculations based on
diﬀerent scenarios for relative productivities.
6.1. Accounting for Europe in 1956
In this section I assess the role of technology and taxes in accounting for the European
time allocations in 1956. I assume a tax rate of .40 for Europe in 1956, and that
agricultural productivity in Europe is such as to generate time devoted to agriculture
that is equal to that in the data. It remains to provide values for productivities in the
other sectors. I consider three cases. Using output per worker from the PWT and hours
per worker in employment from the GGDC, I compute that output per hour in Europe
was .46 that of the US in 1956. In each case considered I require that aggregate output
per hour in Europe in 1956 is equal to .46 of the US value in 1956 in the calibrated
model.22 Case 1 assumes that all three of AI, AS,a n dAN are uniformly lower relative
to their US values. Given the forces in the model, we know that such a speciﬁcation
cannot account for why Europe lags the US in the structural transformation of activity
from industry to services, but it is a useful benchmark nonetheless. Case 2 assumes
that AS and AN are uniformly lower in Europe relative to the US, but AI is allowed to
have a diﬀerent relative value. Speciﬁcally, taking the US growth rates for AI and AS
used in the calibration, I solve for the values of AI and AS that correspond to Europe
lagging the US by a given number of years subject to matching the value for aggregate
relative productivity. This implies that Europe lags the US by 38 years in 1956, and
that AI = .40,a n dAS = .62. (Recall that all productivities are normalized to one
for the US in 1956.) This calculation implicitly assumes that home productivity grew
at the same pace as productivity of market services prior to 1956, so that the uneven
technological change experienced between 1956 and 2000 is speciﬁc to that period.23
Lastly, Case 3 solves for the values of the technology parameters that would perfectly
reproduce the values of time devoted to market activities in Europe in 1956. Results
are presented in Table 4.
22I measure GDP using the prices from the calibrated model for the US in 2000.
23To the extent that this uneven technological change largely manifests itself as an increase in hours
of work by married women, this seems a reasonable assumption.
21Table 4
1956 European Time Allocation
US Data Eur Data Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
HM .330 .364 .351 .363 .364
HA .032 .097 .097 .097 .097
HI .089 .104 .079 .103 .104
HS .209 .164 .175 .164 .164
AI − − .5 .40 .40
AS − − .5 .62 .63
AN − − .5 .62 .63
As expected, Case 1 fails to account for the fact that in 1956 Europe has relatively
greater time allocated to industry and less to services. Instead, Europe devotes less time
to both activities. Two factors are at work here. One is that the greater time devoted
to agriculture in Europe decreases the time available to other activities, and the second
is that the higher tax rate in Europe discourages market work. This second eﬀect is
much greater for services than for industry given the presence of nonmarket substitutes
for the former. However, despite this shortcoming, it is of interest to note that Case 1
does account for much of the observed diﬀerence in total time devoted to market work.
The key force in the model behind this outcome is the nonhomotheticity in preferences
associated with the subsistence constraint on agricultural consumption.24
Case 2 has Europe lagging more in industry than in services in 1956, and thereby is
capable of accounting for the fact that Europe lags in the process of moving labor from
industry to services. In fact, Case 2 comes very close to exactly matching the 1956 time
allocation for Europe. Total market work is somewhat higher in Case 2 than in Case 1
because less time is devoted to producing services and hence the eﬀect of higher taxes
on market work is somewhat smaller. Loosely speaking one can understand one of the
eﬀects of higher taxes as moving a certain percentage of market service work into the
home sector. Given the close match between Case 2 and the actual time allocation in
Europe, it is not surprising that Case 3 virtually reproduces the technology parameters
from Case 2, and therefore merits little additional discussion.
The main message to be taken away from this exercise is that practically all of
the diﬀerences in time allocations between Europe and the US in 1956 seem to be
consistent with a simple story in which Europe lags the US in terms of technology and
has a somewhat higher tax rate.
The above results were for the benchmark case of η = .55. Table 5 shows how the
results of Case 2 are aﬀected by considering alternative values of η.
24More generally, one could have a subsistence constraint that involved some component of consump-
tion of the industrial good and services in additional to the agricultural good. This would soften the
implication of the current speciﬁcation that it is only low productivity in agricultural that leads to
higher hours of market work.
22Table 5
Eﬀect of Changes in η
η = .5 η = .55 η = .60
HM .364 .363 .362
HI .101 .103 .104
HS .167 .164 .162
The message of this table is that the results are not very sensitive to small changes
in η. In all cases one would conclude that the tax and technology speciﬁcation in Case
2 does a very good job of replicating the time allocation in Europe.
It is also of interest to consider the counterfactual of what time allocations in Europe
w o u l dh a v el o o k e dl i k ei fE u r o p eh a dd i ﬀerent tax rates in 1956. Table 6 shows the
results for two counterfactuals: the case in which Europe had the same tax as the US
in 1956, and a second in which Europe had the same tax rate in 1956 as in 2000, here
assumed to be .55. These calculations are carried out assuming the technologies are
those generated by Case 3 in Table 4.
Table 6
Taxes and the 1956 European Time Allocation
Data for 1956 Model
US Europe τ = .35 τ = .55
HM .330 .364 .387 .291
HA .032 .097 .097 .097
HI .089 .104 .108 .089
HS .209 .164 .183 .105
Table 6 shows that if Europe had the same tax as the US in 1956 then hours of
market work would have been more than 16% higher than in the US, rather than 9%
higher as in the actual data. The implication is that even in the absence of changes in
tax and spending policies, hours of market work in Europe would have fallen by this
amount due simply to the process of technological catch-up. Changes in hours of work
in the US prior to 1956 provide some evidence in support of such an eﬀect. Using data
from the US Census, Owen (1986) computes hours of work per adult in 1920 and 1960.
Assuming that Europe lags the US by 38 years in 1956, this time span represents a
comparable lag. Over this period Owen reports that hours of market work per adult of
working age dropped by slightly more than 20%.
The last column of Table 6 shows that if Europe in 1956 had the tax and spending
programs that were in place in 2000, hours of work would have been almost 20% lower
than in the data, and more than 10% below those in the US. For the same reason
as noted earlier, taxes have a somewhat smaller impact on hours of work in the 1956
context than in the 2000 context, due to the smaller role played by the market service
sector.
236.2. Accounting for Europe in 2000
Next we turn to the European time allocation in 2000. I follow a similar procedure as
in the previous subsection. First, I assume that productivity in agriculture is chosen
so as to generate the same time allocated to agriculture as in the data. Second, I
require in each case that aggregate output per hour calculated using prices from the
2000 calibration to the US economy be equal to .96 of the US value, consistent with the
corresponding ﬁgure based on the Penn World Tables data on output per worker and
the Groningen data on hours per employed person. Because European productivities
are so close to those of the US, I only consider two cases. Case 1 assumes that all three
values of AI, AS,a n dAN are uniformly lower than in the US. Case 2 chooses values
of the productivities so as to perfectly match the European time allocations. For each
case I do the calculations both for τ = .55 and for τ = .60. The results are contained
in Table 7.
Table 7
2000 European Time Allocation
Data Model
τ = .60 τ = .55
US Europe Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2
HM .357 .238 .231 .238 .265 .238
HA .008 .010 .010 .010 .010 .010
HI .057 .052 .045 .052 .048 .052
HS .292 .176 .176 .176 .207 .176
AI − − .97 .80 .97 .91
AS − − .97 1.02 .97 .98
AN − − .97 .99 .97 1.26
We begin by discussing the results for Case 1. There are two key points to note.
First, the model implies that tax rates can account for the bulk of the diﬀerences in
aggregate hours of market work. Speciﬁcally, when τ = .6 the model predicts a fall in
hours that slightly exceeds that found in the data, whereas when τ = .55 the drop in
hours relative to the US is about 80% of that found in the data. This conclusion is very
similar to that reached by Prescott (2004). Second, the model predicts that the drop in
hours worked is heavily skewed towards market services, though the magnitude of this
bias is not quite as large as in the data. In the data the ratio HS/HI is equal to 5.12 in
the US and 3.38 in Europe. The model predicts values of 3.91 and 4.31 for τ = .60 and
τ = .55 respectively. When τ = .6 the model implies the same time devoted to market
services as in the data, but implies less time devoted to industry than in the data. When
τ = .55 the model implies more time devoted to market services and less time devoted
to industry than is found in the data. While the model does not imply that taxes can
account for all of the diﬀerences in market time allocations for this proﬁle of technology,
it does imply that taxes can account for the bulk of the observed diﬀerences between
the US and Europe in 2000.
24Next we turn to the results for Case 2. While there is no presumption that taxes and
technology alone can account for all of the diﬀerences in time allocations, it is of interest
to ask what technology parameters would perfectly replicate the market time allocations
for a given tax rate. The results look somewhat diﬀerent for the two tax rates. For
the case of τ = .60 a large gap in industry and market services relative to the US is
required to account for the European time allocation, whereas when τ = .55 a large gap
between home and market service productivity relative to the US is required. (Recall
that the sign of the productivity diﬀerence is not really determined if one considers the
two diﬀerent forms of technological progress in the home sector.) The diﬀerences are
intuitive given the results for Case 1. In Case 1, both tax rates generated too little time
devoted to industry. The way to ﬁx this is to make industry less productive relative to
services. Since the gap is larger for τ = .60, a larger productivity gap is required. Having
ﬁxed this dimension, it remains to get the right time allocated to market services. There
are two mechanisms in the model that reallocate time between market services and the
home sector: relative productivities and taxes. The larger the tax rate diﬀerences, for
given preference parameters the greater will be the decrease in market services that is
accounted for by taxes and the less need there is for relative productivity diﬀerences to
contribute. If taxes decrease then more work must be done by the relative productivity
channel.
6.3. Taxes, Time Allocations and Welfare
A closely related exercise to that carried out in the last subsection is to ask what time
allocations in the US in 2000 would look like if tax and spending programs in the US
were to be raised to European levels. Table 8 shows the results.
Table 8
Taxes and the 2000 US Time Allocation
Data for 2000 Model
US Europe τ = .40 τ = .55 τ = .60
HM .357 .238 .357 .263 .229
HA .008 .010 .008 .008 .008
HI .057 .052 .057 .048 .045
HS .292 .176 .292 .207 .177
HN .187 .252 .278
1 − HM − HN .456 .485 .492
The result is clear: if the US were to adopt European magnitude tax and spending
programs, then the time allocation in the US would look remarkably similar to the time
allocation in Europe. I conclude on the basis of this and the results from the previous
subsection that tax diﬀerences seem to account for the bulk of the diﬀerences found in
2000.
25This table also includes values for time spent in homework and leisure. In moving
from τ = .40 to τ = .60 the table shows that market work decreases, home work
increases and leisure increases. Much of the decrease in market work is oﬀset by an
increase in home work. Speciﬁcally, the total decrease in market work is .128, but there
is an increase in home work of .091, implying that roughly 75% of the decrease in market
work is oﬀset by increased work at home. This magnitude is intermediate between the
estimates of Ragan (2005) and those of Freeman and Schettkat (2002) and Olovsson
(2004). This calculation underscores a key point. In this model, the dominant eﬀect of
taxes is to move work out of the market sector and into the home sector. While higher
t a x e sd ol e a dt oas i g n i ﬁcant increase in leisure, the increase in leisure accounts for only
about one quarter of the change in hours of market work.
It is worth commenting on the relationship between these results and those of
Prescott (2004). Like Prescott, I have assumed preferences over consumption and leisure
that are log-log. However, my model has added home production and assumed that time
allocation between the home and market is quite elastic. In view of this one may wonder
why I do not ﬁnd even larger eﬀects of taxes than Prescott. The reason is that both
models assume that same fraction of the total time endowment is devoted to market
work, implying that the model with home production has a lower value of leisure. Given
identical log-log preferences in the two models, the percentage change in leisure in re-
sponse to tax rates is very similar in the two models. But since leisure is lower in the
home production, a given percentage change in leisure translates into a smaller change
in time spent working. However, this smaller eﬀect is then augmented by the eﬀect
associated with substitution between market and home production.
Finally, it is also of interest to assess the welfare eﬀects of taxes in this model. In
the context of the previous calculation for the US economy we ask by what amount the
proﬁle of nonagricultural market consumption would have to be decreased in order to
make individuals indiﬀerent to living in the economy with a tax rate of 60% as opposed
to remaining in the economy with a tax rate of 40%.T h ea n s w e ri s19%,w h i c hi st h e
same as that reported by Prescott (2004) for a similar calculation. This too may seem
somewhat surprising given the presence of home production in the current analysis.
While this makes hours of market work more responsive to taxes, it should also make
the responses less costly from a welfare perspective since home production is a good
substitute for market consumption. However, it should be noted that since the current
analysis has no capital, the calculated welfare cost is probably more comparable to the
steady-state welfare gain in the model of Prescott, which would be larger.
To summarize, this section shows that if the US in 2000 were to adopt European
level tax and spending programs, time allocations in the US would change dramatically
and would closely resemble those observed in Europe. Additionally, this would entail a
large loss in welfare.
267. Conclusion
This paper makes three key points regarding the evolution of labor market outcomes in
Europe relative to the US. First, it argues that much of the literature on the European
labor market problem has misdiagnosed the problem by focusing on relative unemploy-
ment rather than relative employment levels. Speciﬁcally, the magnitude of the problem
is much larger than suggested by unemployment rate diﬀerentials and the timing is very
diﬀerent. Second, the key to the understanding the source of the European labor market
problem is to understand why Europe has not developed a market service sector more
similar to that of the US as it has closed the gap with the US in terms of output per
hour. Third, it shows that a story in which productivity diﬀerences and taxes are central
can potentially go a long way to accounting for the relative deterioration of European
labor market outcomes. To be sure, the model analyzed here is very simple and the
calculations must be viewed as a ﬁrst step toward assessing the role of various factors
in accounting for the evolution of hours worked across countries. An important task for
future work is to assess speciﬁc tax and spending programs in models that incorporate
the heterogeneity that is relevant for these programs.
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